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THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: US AND UK ROLES
IN THE CREATION OF A UNIFIED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Bruce Carolan
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union came into existence in 1992, as the result of the
adoption of the Treaty on European Union. But the seeds of the European Union
were sown many years earlier. The "birth" of the European Union as the world
knows it today occurred with the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951. In this sense, the European Union arose from the ashes of
World War II. "Less fertile terrain for the growth of the structures of
international cooperation can scarcely be imagined."' Konrad Adenauer, first
Chancellor of Germany following the end of World War II, described the
German city of Cologne in April 1945, shortly before the end of the war, as a
"ghost city., '2 According to Adenauer, "more than half the houses and public
buildings were totally destroyed. . .. There was no gas, no water, no electric
current, and no means of transport. ' 3 Such scenes of devastation were repeated
across Europe.
Yet in 1951, six European nations, all historic enemies, entered into the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. Under the ECSC Treaty,
France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg) agreed to relinquish a measure of their national sovereignty to
international institutions. These institutions could make binding decisions
related to the operation of the coal and steel industries for the respective member
countries. The economic, political and social integration of Europe did not end
(or begin for that matter, as discussed below,) with the ECSC. In less than a
1. MARK GILBERT, SURPASSING REALISM: THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE
1945, at 15 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2003).
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id.
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decade, after some dramatic disappointments,4 these same six countries entered
into the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Through a series of
Treaty amendments over the next 50 years, the European Economic Community
has become the modem European Union (EU). The EU, now with 27 Member
States, represents one of the deepest forms of political, social and economic
integration among sovereign nations in history. Within a broader European
context, the economic integration of Europe culminating in the European Union
has contributed to a sustained period of peace in Europe, a region of the world
previously plagued by frequent wars.
5
It might be assumed that Britain participated actively in the "birth" of the
European Union. Although Britain has always stood aloof from continental
Europe, in the immediate post-war years, British prestige was very high. 6 As
other European nations fell, it had stood alone against Fascism and Nazi
Germany. As early as September 19, 1946, Sir Winston Churchill, recently
ousted as Prime Minister, gave his "Zurich speech" in which he stated, "We
must build a kind of United States of Europe .... This sentiment alone should
have signalled British involvement in European integration efforts.
Surprisingly, Britain did not participate in negotiations leading to the
ECSC. In fact, its influence over the course of European integration diminished
as continental Europe moved forward towards European integration without
British participation. According to Stuart Croft, "In January 1948, Britain was
leading the movement towards a closer association of West European
nations .... But by January 1949, Britain had apparently lost the leadership of
Europe, and the British were widely regarded as being responsible for
undermining the movement towards European unity."8 What accounts for this
change? And what was the role of the United States in the early steps towards
formation of the modem European Union?
From the perspective of modem-day Europe, it can be argued that Britain
miscalculated how best to protect its interests in the post-war period. In
opposing continental European ideas about integration in general and the ECSC
4. These disappointments comprised the failure of a proposed European Defence Community
and European Political Community.
5. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) undoubtedly has helped maintain
peace in Europe, its primary function was to deter the threat of U.S.S.R. aggression. European
integration has reduced the threat of war among the countries who participated in this integration.
6. Clemens A. Wurm, The Making of the European Community - Aux Origines de la
Communaut6 Europkene: Britain, Western Europe and European Integration 1945-57: The View
from the Continent, 6 EUR. REV. HIST. 235, 236 (1999).
7. ARNOLD J. ZURCHER, THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE 1940-1958, at 21 (N. Y. Univ. Press
1958).
8. Stuart Croft, British Policy Towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of Possible
Worlds? 64 INT'L AFF. 617, 626 (1988).
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in particular, Britain placed considerable emphasis on its "special relationship"
with the United States. The irony is that its stance annoyed the United States,
and damaged the special relationship that the U.K. held so dear. The U.S., by
adopting a supportive but "hands off' attitude towards the Schuman Proposal,
contributed more to the creation of the modem EU than did Britain. The latter
observation is rarely made in contemporary historical accounts of the founding
of the European Union.
II. EVENTS AFTER WORLD WAR II RELEVANT TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The modem history of European integration commences with the end of the
Second World War in Europe, in May 1945, with calls emanating from
resistance fighters and governments in exile for an integrated Europe. 9 Modem
European integration, leading to the European Union, is generally agreed to have
been bom with the dramatic declaration of French Foreign Minister Robert
Schuman of May 9, 1950. This declaration was largely the work of French
senior civil servant Jean Monnet, who headed up the planning office responsible
for French economic reconstruction. In his remarks to a press conference called
for the occasion, Schuman proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). The ECSC would pool the resources of the French and
German coal and steel industries (the traditional industries of war), and place
them under a supranational High Authority. Other European nations were
invited to join.
It is impossible to list all of the significant events leading up to the
announcement of the Schuman Plan. Churchill's 1946 Zurich speech could be
perceived as a strong British commitment to creating a federal, or supranational,
Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, on March 12, 1947, U.S. President
Harry Truman, in an address to the joint houses of Congress, committed the
American people to providing financial and other assistance "essential to
economic stability and orderly political processes."' 0  Perhaps more
significantly, in June of 1947, in a Harvard University commencement address,
Secretary of State George Marshall announced the financial aid package
formally known as the European Recovery Plan (ERP) that came to bear his
9. DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINCE 1945, at 9 (A.J. Nicholls & Martin S. Alexander eds., Longman Group UK Lmtd. 2d
ed., 1995).
10. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, Address before a Joint Session
of Congress (Mar. 12, 1947) (transcript available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/trudoc.asp).
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name, "The Marshall Plan.""l These U.S. developments reflected American will
to provide the necessary resources for promoting European integration.
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was formed
in the wake of the ERP. The OEEC grew out of an ad hoc meeting of European
diplomats in Paris in 1947 to discuss administration of the Marshall Plan. It
had the potential for being the source of the development of a federal Europe. In
May 1948, the Congress of Europe was held in the Hague. It called for a
European Parliament. 13 This ultimately led to the creation of the Council of
Europe, headquartered in Strasbourg.
Allan M. Williams argues that there is no "inevitable causality" in the
sequence of events described above. 14 The trajectory of events, however, would
have suggested that proposals for the creation of supranational institutions would
have emanated either from the OEEC or the Council of Europe. In fact,
participants in the creation of the OEEC and the Council of Europe had argued
for these institutions to have greater supranational characteristics; one might
have expected for a plan such as the ECSC Treaty to originate there. But the
proposal to create the supranational ECSC instead originated "in the narrow
confines of the French planning office."' 15 There was little or no advance notice
to the U.K.16 (the United States received at least one day's advance notice of the
Schuman plan, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson stopped in Paris on his
way to a ministerial conference in London 7 ). Where was Great Britain? How
did Britain react to and support the proposed Schuman Plan and subsequent
efforts at European integration? How did the U.S. react to the announcement?
III. UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION
Initially, Great Britain wanted to "assume an active role in the
reconstruction of Europe .... , However, the British were hobbled by the cost
of administering their German occupation zone, as they had insisted on the zone
11. DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 25-26 (Lynne
Reinner Pub., Inc. 2004).
12. ZURCHER, supra note 7, at 34.
13. See Jan Melissen & Bert Zeeman, Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities
Lost?, 63 INT'L AFF. 81, 90 (1986-7).
14. ALLAN M. WILLIAMS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INTEGRATION
26 (Felix Driver & Neil Roberts eds., Blackwell Pub. 2d ed., 1994).
15. DiNAN, supra note 11, at 5.
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id.
18. ROBERT H. LIESHOUT, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 39 (Edward Elgar 1999).
[Vol. 16:1
THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
S19
with the largest population. There were other impediments to the British
playing a lead role. There were deep differences in French and British concerns
and perceptions, which influenced thinking on the best means to progress
European reconstruction. Britain was concerned with the strength of sterling and
the battle against inflation; France was focused on industrial revitalization and
supporting the agricultural sector. There were also deep philosophical
divisions between the U.K. and continental Europe on the form that European
reconstruction should take. The French, backed by the U.S., favored a supra-
national approach, characterized by international institutions with powers to bind
nations. The British favored a more traditional, intergovernmental approach,
characterized by ministerial meetings requiring consensus decision making.
The posturing of the French and British governments in the post-war period
reflected their philosophical differences. The French, in the 1947 negotiations
leading to the OEEC, pushed for the organization to possess supranational
characteristics with an international secretariat that would serve as a vehicle for
promoting closer European integration. The British resisted this suggestion,
and in its final form the OEEC functioned in a traditional, intergovernmental
manner, with an Executive Committee, chaired by the British, representing the
real seat of power. 22 To add insult to injury, the British appointed Sir Edmund
Hall-Patch, "a Treasury official seconded to the [British] Foreign Office ," as
first Chair of the OEEC Executive Committee, reflecting subjugation of the
OEEC to the British Foreign Office. 23 The Americans had wanted appointments
to the Executive Committee to be at ministerial level.
24
This difference in viewpoints is also reflected in the negotiations leading to
the creation of the Council of Europe. Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri
Spaak, America's choice for chair of the Council of the OEEC, because of his
supranational leanings, thought it a good time to push for a directly elected
European Assembly within the context of the Congress of Europe.25 He invited
the European Movement to submit detailed plans, and it did.
U.K. sentiment remained resolutely opposed to any supranational
institutions, and Labour Party British Prime Minister Clement Attleee opposed
bringing forth the idea. The resulting "compromise," embodied in the Treaty of
Westminster signed on May 5, 1947, creating the Statute of the Council of
19. Id.
20. Wurm, supra note 6, at 238.
21. Croft, supra note 8, at 624-25 (In their arguments the French were acting as proxy for the
U.S.).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 625 (addition to original).
24. Id.
25. ZURCHER, supra note 7, at 37.
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Europe, was a bicameral body, but with an Assembly largely devoid of any real
power. The Consultative Assembly, as finally constituted, could not even set its
own agenda; the members of the Council of Ministers, which functioned in a
traditional intergovernmental manner, had to approve the Assembly's proposed
agenda.
26
European leaders such as German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Paul-
Henri Spaak came to view Britain as aloof and remote from Continental
European concerns. According to Wurm, "Adenauer remarked that Britain 'feels
itself to be a neighbour of Europe rather than a European nation.'27
IV. U.S. ATTITUDES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The United States was largely absent from efforts to rebuild Europe after
the end of the First World War. The situation differed after the Second World
War. Part of the reason for U.S. involvement in post-WWII reconstruction
efforts was the developing "cold war" and the desire to stem Soviet power and
influence in Western Europe. The U.S. sought "an economically buoyant"
Europe as a bulwark against communism. 28 It had a vision of "an international
economic system conducive to free trade and unfettered investment."
' 29
Britain lacked the resources to drive European-wide recovery. The U.S.,
fearful that poverty and misery helped spread communism, took a more active
role. First, the Truman Doctrine pledged support to defend democracy when it
was threatened. Second, the Marshall Plan pledged economic support to rebuild
Europe. However, the United States did not wish merely to respond to a "wish
list" of monetary demands from European countries. "The United States offered
to provide Europe with money and goods, but only if the Europeans themselves
came up with a plan for using the aid, and only if the plan was designed as a
joint effort rather than a hodgepodge of national requests." 30
Furthermore, the U.S. wanted the Europeans to adopt a federal structure as
a condition of receiving Marshall Plan aid. The U.S. provided a list of essential
features to Western European governments including free trade, customs union,
and the reduction of social welfare. 31 The OEEC was created to help administer
U.S. aid but, contrary to U.S. wishes, the organization was and remained
predominantly intergovernmental in nature.
26. Id. at 45.
27. Wurm, supra note 6, at 240.
28. DINAN, supra note 11, at 20.
29. Id. at 15.
30. JOHN VAN OUDENAREN, UNITING EUROPE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD 3 (Ronald Tiersky ed., Rowan & Littlefield Pub., Inc. 2000).
31. GILBERT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
[Vol. 16:1
THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In addition, the U.S. pressured France to come up with a supranational
solution to the German problem. In October 1949, then Secretary of State Dean
Acheson met in Washington, D.C. with "the more important American
Ambassadors in Western Europe," and pressed for French action towards
European integration. 32 He gave them a letter specifying what he wanted them
to do. "I have in mind," he wrote, "a timetable for the creation of supra-national
institutions, operating on a less than unanimity basis for dealing with specific,
economic, social and perhaps other problems.
According to historian Desmond Dinan, "[w]hat the Americans really
wanted was what eventually happened in Europe not in 1952 but in 1992: a
single market involving the free movement of goods, services and capital."
' 34
What the U.S. suggested was the type of strong federal system usually termed
supranationalism. "To locate deep and abiding enthusiasm for the supranational
principle, one must turn to the United States," according to British historian John
Gillingham.
35
Eventually, France faced a deadline from the U.S. A meeting of Allied
Foreign Ministers was scheduled for London in May 1950. Secretary of State
Acheson gave Robert Schuman, his French counterpart, a deadline of May 1950
to devise a plan.36 By this time, it was clear that the U.K. could not be relied
upon to formulate a plan acceptable to the United States. They had been
successful in limiting the supranational aspirations of both the OEEC and the
Council of Europe, and had slowed the continental European movement towards
deeper integration. Ironically, it may have been the signing of the NATO
Treaty-representing a type of intergovernmental cooperation favoured by the
British-which created the policy space for continental Europe to move forward
without Britain. With the U.S. firmly committed to the defence of Western
Europe from Soviet aggression, the U.K. became less important from a military
point of view and, accordingly, less necessary to European integration plans.
Thus, on May 9, 1950, on the deadline imposed by Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, Robert Schuman made his announcement. Britain was reported to
have received no prior notice of the announcement, "because of Schuman's
concern that London would again obstruct a major European initiative."' 37
32. ALAN S. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-51, at 391 (Univ. Cal.
Press 1984).
33. Id.
34. DINAN, supra note 11, at 26.
35. JOHN GILLINGHAM, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1950-2003: SUPERSTATE OR NEW MARKET
ECONOMY? 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
36. DINAN, supra note 11, at 35.
37. Id. at 39.
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V. THE SCHUMAN PLAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
On January 24, 1950, a meeting of high-ranking U.S. officials concerned
with European reconstruction was held in Washington, D.C. 38 The meeting
contains hints of the growing friction between the U.S. and Britain over
European economic recovery. 39  Averell Harriman, the U.S. special
representative to Europe, expressed "the opinion that the British have violated
their commitments under the Marshall plan through lack of cooperation
economically with the European Continental countries ... The minutes
contain the ominous and prescient comments:
Mr. Bohlen [Minister, Embassy Paris] said that ever since the war we have
been putting every pressure on the French to do something or other and very
little on the British, and that the historic feeling of fraternal association with
the British, enhanced by our wartime partnership, has led to an assumption on
the part of this government of the basic correctness of British positions
without subjecting those positions to critical examination. 41
On May 9, 1950, at 1 p.m.-just a few hours before Schuman's historic
announcement-a telegram was sent by the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on
his way to London for a meeting of Allied foreign ministers, to the Acting
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: "I believe it possible that tomorrow, or
soon afterward, French Government may propose important approaches toward
Germany in economic field." 42 He recognised, "the proposal, if made, may have
very considerable possibilities. It may be very controversial."4 3 Later that same
day, Acheson sent another telegram stating that he had just learned that the
French cabinet had approved the proposal that morning and that Robert Schuman
would be making an announcement that afternoon. The text of the French
statement followed the same day. The following morning, Acheson sent a
telegram stating, in what would turn out to be an understatement, "British
reaction has not yet developed but believe it is apt to be somewhat cautious."
45
The afternoon of May 10, 1950, John Foster Dulles-soon to be Secretary of
State under President Eisenhower-telegrammed Acheson in London that "it is
my initial impression that the conception is brilliantly creative and could go far
38. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950, VOLUME III,
WESTERN EUROPE 617 (S. Everett Gleason et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT].
39. Croft, supra note 8, at 625.
40. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 618.
41. Id. at 620 (addition to original).
42. Id. at 691-92.
43. Id. at 692.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 695.
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to solve the most dangerous problem of our time, namely the relationship of
Germany's industrial power to France and the West.' 46 This enthusiasm was
characteristic of U.S. attitudes to the Schuman Plan.
The British did not share U.S. excitement for the plan. A telegram from
Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the
British Ambassador to France, Sir 0. Harvey, dated May 9, 1950, reveals a visit
to Mr. Bevin that day from the French Ambassador to Britain, M.R. Massigli.
The French Ambassador brought with him "an urgent message from M.
Schuman, regarding a decision which was taken by the French cabinet this
morning." 47  The telegram contained considerable detail about the Schuman
plan. It is noticeably lacking in enthusiasm.
The minutes of the Third Bipartite Ministerial Meeting in London on May
10, 1950, contain evidence of Britain's misgivings about French efforts to
deepen European integration. 4 8 Mr. Bevin's comments reveal a British tendency
to oppose issues by arguing against raising them for discussion. The minutes
reveal that Mr. Bevin contended, "[t]he question of what body should be charged
with the general direction of the Western effort might well be left alone for the
time being .... [I]t was premature to take decisions of this kind at the present
juncture."49
The Third Bipartite was overshadowed by the Schuman proposal. The
weeks following this announcement reveal the differing attitudes of the British
and American governments. While the U.S. government wanted to preserve its
ultimate options - particularly if the ECSC came to be seen as a cartel that might
damage U.S. interests - it is clear that the government view generally favoured
the French efforts. U.S. Special Representative to Europe Harriman wrote to
Dean Acheson on May 20, 1950: "Believe proposal may well prove most
important step towards economic progress and peace of Europe since original
Marshall speech on ERP."
50
46. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 695.
47. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS SERIES II, VOLUME I: THE SCHUMAN PLAN, THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, MAY 1950- DECEMBER 1952, at I
(Roger Bullen & M.E. Pelly eds., 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY]. If the dates
on the respective U.S. and British telegrams are accurate, it appears that the U.K. did receive
advance notice - albeit very brief notice - of Schuman's announcement. In his telegram to Dulles
on May 10, 1950, after the full significance of Schuman's announcement apparently had sunk in,
Acheson revealed that Jean Monnett had discussed the plan in some detail "on the night before the
announcement", i.e., May 8, 1950. Thus, there is evidence that U.S. representatives were "tipped
off" before their British counterparts. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 694-95.
48. See DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY, supra note 47, at 7-13.
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 702.
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Britain, in the meantime, continued with its tactics of delay. After the
announcement of the Schuman plan, with its implicit invitation to other countries
such as Italy to join in the discussions, British Secretary of State Bevin on May
25 wrote to London's Ambassador in Paris, "I feel that the important thing is to
get something started soon." 51 What he proposed, however, would have slowed
the process. He rejected French calls for an international conference to progress
the proposal saying, "[a] full scale international conference ... seems to me an
inappropriate way of handling this affair in the next stage." 52  He initially
suggested negotiations about discussions between France and Germany alone.
He was forced to withdraw this suggestion when informed that other
governments already had been invited to participate.
53
Despite the effort to delay proceedings, events moved swiftly, prejudicing
the British approach of seeking delay. In short order, the French government,
anxious to issue a communique announcing the start of negotiations, issued an
ultimatum to the British. On June 1, the British Ambassador to France reported
to his Government. He wrote that the French had given Britain until 8 p.m. the
following day to agree the language of a communiqu6 to the effect that the
conference would have as its "immediate aim" the setting up of a supranational
authority to govern coal and steel production of the participating nations (the
language had been changed from stating that the participating countries had
"decided" to set up such an authority). 54  On June 2, 1950, the British
government refused this request, essentially excluding Britain from the
subsequent negotiations.
55
The U.S. government saw this coming. The U.S. Ambassador to France,
David Bruce, wrote to Dean Acheson on May 31, 1950, "that the British
Government will not join in the declaration as now drafted.... [T]he French will
issue the declaration as now drafted and signed by whatever continental
countries may join, regardless of the British attitude. ' 56 On June 2, in the hours
before the British refusal, Acheson wrote to U.S. Diplomatic Officers in various
cities, including London, Paris, and Moscow, that "US welcomes Schuman
proposal as imaginative and constructive initiative in field of Eur economic and
political relations."
' 57
51. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY, supra note 47, at 89.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 99.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id. at 135-36.
56. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 711.
57. Id. at 714.
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On June 4, 1950, Ambassador Bruce wrote to Acheson. His comments
reflect the damage to U.S./U.K. relations from the British attitude to the
Schuman proposal:
It is regrettable that [the] UK did not see its way clear to endorse [this]
scheme at this time by accepting [the] chief principle involved namely [the]
creation of [a] supranational authority to direct coal and steel pooling
arrangement.
One cannot predict how the policy of the British Government may now unfold
in this particular.... It is said that its Commonwealth obligations make it
impossible to adhere as a full partner just as it had been unwilling for the
same reason to join unreservedly in the operations of the OEEC.
There are other explanations of the UK attitude all of which probably had
some bearing on its action. Perhaps the most important point.. . is the
traditional foreign policy of the UK still tenaciously if somewhat covertly
cherished despite debilitating wars and diminution of Empire, that assesses
European politics in terms of balance of power.
58
A similar hint of annoyance is evident in communications from the U.S.
Ambassador to London to Acheson on June 5, 1950. Referring to the recent
British ploy of issuing a public call for "talks about talks" after knowing this had
been rejected by the French, he wrote:
Why did the British undertake to challenge French leadership? On the one
hand they were not prepared to join in the Schuman proposal, and on the
other, they were not prepared to pay the consequences for not joining. The
only way in which they could escape from either horn of this dilemma was to
frustrate the whole project or to recast it according to their own liking. They
believe . . . that a ministerial meeting to discuss either procedure or substance
would probably produce precisely this effect.
I believe that our missions in Europe should be authorized, if this is
necessary, discreetly and wisely to support French leadership in this matter.
58. Id. at 715-16 (addition to original).
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The British may have some good reasons for not participating in the
negotiations. Some of the reasons they have advanced are, however, I think59
no more than excuses.
Thus, the British had mishandled a key moment in the history of European
integration. British reluctance to participate as a full partner continued with its
refusal to participate in the Messina conference chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak,
which eventually led to the creation-again without U.K. participation-of the
European Economic Community in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The British
sought to establish a competing organisation, the European Free Trade Area, but
its members' rates of economic growth failed to keep pace with those members
of the European Economic Community. Finally, in 1961, the U.K. formally
applied for membership in the EEC. However, France opposed British
membership, which was not acquired until 1973.
VI. CONCLUSION
How have historians judged Britain's role in the creation of the EU?
Clemens A. Wurm argues that Britain's influence in Europe was reduced by its
failure to participate in negotiations leading to the ECSC, and by its later
withdrawal from negotiations leading to the EEC. Stuart Croft writes,
"although the British were successful in undermining.., moves towards
[European] unity, they were forced to pay a heavy price. Not only did they have
to abdicate the leadership of Europe, they were also excluded from further
political developments ... for the next two decades."
61
Philip Thody quotes Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee on his reasons
for not joining the ECSC: Attlee said that Britain was "not going to join a group
of nations in which we have just saved four of them from the other two ......
Thody points out the similarity of this comment to remarks made by the fictional
civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby to his Minister in the British television
comedy of the 1980s, "Yes, Minister", in which Humphrey explains that the
British government has
had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last five hundred years-
to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch
against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and
59. Id. at 719.
60. Wurm, supra note 6, at 245.
61. Croft, supra note 8, at 626 (addition to original).
62. PHILIP THODY, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 (Routledge
1997).
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the Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Italians and
the Germans ... 63
Is the judgement of history justified? The British handling of deeper
European integration in general and the ECSC proposal does appear comical in
retrospect. Britain's empire has declined. The relationship with the
Commonwealth has diminished in importance. Its actions alienated the U.S. It
applied for EEC membership in 1961, only to be kept waiting until 1973. The
conclusions of numerous historians appear correct: Britain made a serious
mistake in reacting to the ECSC. What is also apparent is that the U.S. made a
greater contribution to the successful birth of the EU. Its light-touch approach,
underpinned with deadlines and soto voce instructions to European diplomats to
support the French government proposals, helped start a process that continues
50 years later and that, in a broader European context, has helped bring peace to
a troubled region. Even with the defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish
referendum on June 12, 2008, the EU will continue in its all-important goal of
promoting peace in this part of the world.
63. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Yes, Minister: The Writing on the Wall, BBC television broadcast, Mar.
24, 1980).
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